




November 2010

global witness

# Understanding **REDD+**

The Role of Governance, Enforcement and Safeguards in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation



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Developed countries have pledged over US\$4 billion to scale up REDD+ and fast track its implementation over the next two years.<sup>1</sup> So what is REDD+ and why is it so important? This briefing explains this complex initiative to tackle forest destruction, and demonstrates the importance of good governance, financial transparency, strong enforcement and safeguards to overcome the challenges and risks countries face as they get 'ready' for REDD+ implementation.

## What is REDD+ and why is it important?

REDD+ is an international mechanism under negotiation within the UN climate talks and other international forums which will provide compensation to governments, communities, companies or individuals in developing countries for actions taken to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation below an established reference level. In essence, it aims to incentivise forest protection over forest destruction. REDD+ is expected to be an integral part of a new climate agreement and to include a system for monitoring activities and ensuring they deliver results. The 'plus' relates to the scope of activities qualifying for compensation.<sup>2</sup>

Forests not only absorb carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) from the atmosphere, acting as natural sinks, but when they are destroyed or degraded they release large amounts of CO<sub>2</sub> into the air, contributing significantly to global warming. Forest loss contributes as much as 12-15% of annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, about the same as the entire global transport sector. When forest degradation and peatland degradation are included, emissions from deforestation and forest degradation are estimated at up to 20% of total global emissions.<sup>3</sup> Past attempts to tackle forest loss in developing countries have mostly failed, undermined by policy failures, weak governance and perverse incentives. REDD+ presents the best chance yet to reverse the downward trend – but only if the design, implementation and priorities are right.

## The multi-track negotiations and rise of the REDD+ Partnership

The overarching agreement on REDD+ is being negotiated under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). However, under intense political pressure to fast-track the process, the rules governing REDD+ are evolving rapidly and simultaneously under three multilateral institutions; the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the UN-REDD Programme,<sup>4</sup> and the Forest Investment Programme (FIP). Under UN-REDD and the FCPF, which is hosted by the World Bank, countries are developing national strategies through a process known as 'REDD+ readiness'. In a rapidly evolving situation unprecedented in international environmental law, the proposals for these strategies, called Readiness Preparation Proposals (R-PPs) or in the case of UN-REDD National Programme Documents (NPDs), are evolving in parallel with international standards and procedures. The FIP, meanwhile, has been established under the World Bank's Strategic Climate Fund to provide bridge financing for reforms identified through readiness. It aims to mobilise public and private investment for REDD+ and catalyse transformational change in forest policies and practices. In addition to these multilateral processes, several bilateral deals on REDD+ have been struck, while a growing number of pilot REDD+ projects are being established around the world by NGOs and the private sector. The result is an extraordinarily complex web of processes, finance mechanisms and unregulated projects which are all feeding into REDD+ design.



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Deforestation and forest degradation contributes up to 20% of annual greenhouse gas emissions, more than the entire global transport sector.



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**Financial mechanisms for REDD+ should not subsidise industrial-scale extraction of timber from intact natural forests.**

The REDD+ Partnership rose out of the ashes of Copenhagen. Only recently were modalities for stakeholder engagement agreed after extensive controversy. These modalities still need to be “road tested” and developed through practice to ensure full and effective participation, particularly of indigenous peoples.

The newest multilateral initiative, the REDD+ Partnership, rose out of the ashes of the failed Copenhagen climate talks. The Partnership, formed in May 2010 and which as of October 2010 included 70 countries, aims to scale up REDD+ actions and finance and to improve transparency and coordination of initiatives and financial instruments pending the conclusion of a REDD+ agreement under the UNFCCC. These aims may appear practical given the many REDD+ initiatives and potential overlaps. But until its most recent meetings in China in October 2010, disagreements among Partners, lack of transparency and the exclusion of stakeholders hampered progress. More progress towards coordination has been achieved through joint consultations between the FCPF, UN-REDD and FIP than under the Partnership. However, there are signs the REDD+ Partnership is becoming more functional and transparent, having agreed modalities for stakeholder engagement in October, although these still need to be “road tested” and developed through practice to ensure full and effective participation, particularly of indigenous peoples. The Partnership has embarked on a programme of workshops, analyses and the development of a database, and is seeking stakeholder input to its 2011-12 work programme, to be agreed in Cancun where the next climate talks will be held from 29 November – 10 December 2010.

## REDD+ finance and the role of carbon markets

Eventually REDD+ is anticipated to involve the transfer to developing countries of US\$15-25 billion a year through a performance-based mechanism. So compensation will be based on results. Meanwhile, the groundwork is being laid to expand REDD+ to cover emissions from agricultural practices (known as REDD++), a move which would greatly increase anticipated financial flows.

The mechanism for long-term financing of REDD+ and disbursement of funds has not yet been determined but is expected to entail a combination of donor finance through public funds and private finance raised through the carbon markets. The role of the markets, however, is controversial. Proponents consider them the only practical means of providing the scale of finance needed for REDD+ to succeed. Opponents, meanwhile, consider they involve risks that are undermining climate mitigation while providing a means for developed countries to escape responsibility to reduce their own domestic emissions.

There are two types of carbon markets, compliance markets and voluntary markets. A compliance market is a market created by a regulatory act by national or sub-national governments (e.g. under the Kyoto Protocol or through regional schemes); thus participants shape their economic behaviour to comply with the regulations. In contrast, participants in voluntary markets buy emission reductions for reasons such as public relations, personal commitments or corporate social responsibility.

Carbon credits are the currency of both the compliance and voluntary carbon markets. These credits operate



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**Forest-dependent people often do not have recognised legal rights or titles to forest land and are vulnerable to evictions and loss of access.**

as permits that allow owners to emit a certain amount of carbon dioxide (or another greenhouse gas measured in units equivalent to carbon dioxide).<sup>5</sup> They are allocated to countries or companies as part of cap-and-trade emissions regulatory regimes in which policymakers set a cap on total emissions and the market sets a price for those emissions through trading. Emitters above the cap purchase carbon credits in international markets from those which are below the cap. Over time, the intent is that regulators of compliance markets lower the cap and reduce the quantity of credits available, which in theory will increase the price of carbon and incentivise emissions reduction. Such regimes are considered a cost effective way of regulating emissions, though how effective they are is a matter of debate. In addition, carbon credits, operating as offsets, can be generated under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This enables developed countries to offset their emissions by investing in projects that are meant to reduce emissions in developing countries where costs are lower.

Currently, credits for REDD+ projects are only available through the voluntary markets. Projects can be certified under standard setting schemes such as the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS)<sup>6</sup> and the Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA). Projects that rate highly in terms of sustainability, verifiability, and social responsibility command higher prices for carbon credits. The CDM is the only compliance market currently available for land use projects. However, it includes only reforestation and afforestation (tree planting<sup>7</sup>); projects which protect existing forests and

generate REDD+ credits are excluded. The first REDD+ credits to be offered as part of a compliance market are likely to be under the California cap-and-trade programme but it is already attracting criticism from environmental groups. The CDM, meanwhile, has been the subject of extensive criticism for its environmental and social impacts and tainted by evidence of fraud, leading to a recent suspension of issuance of credits.<sup>8</sup>

## The challenges and risks of REDD+

While REDD+ presents an unprecedented opportunity to mobilise countries and reform the failed policies and practices that have driven forest loss, it also entails enormous challenges and carries a considerable risk of failure. The challenges to REDD+ design and implementation include:

- Establishing the global, national and sub-national architecture for REDD+ to manage and track disbursements and monitor programmes and funds to enable performance-based payments in the readiness phase as well as on the basis of results in terms of emissions reductions.
- Ensuring transparency of the money flows both through the international mechanisms and domestically within recipient countries.
- Identifying needs and building capacities to ensure good governance and effective enforcement in countries where institutions are weak.

- Ensuring REDD+ delivers social benefits with full and effective participation of stakeholders in REDD+ design and implementation, particularly civil society, indigenous groups and forest-dependent communities, many of whom live in remote places.
- Ensuring REDD+ delivers environmental benefits and prioritises the protection of intact natural forests and removes perverse incentives that could otherwise support industrial-scale extraction of timber and forest products within intact natural forests.
- Setting reference levels for countries where data is poor or non-existent.
- Establishing minimum standards for good governance and social and environmental safeguards necessary to avert risks.
- Establishing a REDD+ monitoring system to measure, report and verify (MRV) emissions reductions as well as to monitor, report and verify progress towards good governance and the implementation of social and environmental safeguards.
- Establishing national systems for governance assessment and monitoring that include participatory independent monitoring led by local civil society and involving all stakeholders, thus increasing transparency and inclusiveness in the design, implementation and review of REDD+ activities.
- Establishing principles and criteria for the fair distribution of benefits and financial incentives across countries, and ensuring benefits are distributed equitably in-country and reach forest communities.
- Establishing an effective complaints and redress mechanism through which those affected by negative impacts of any REDD+ activity can voice their concerns, infractors can be prosecuted and affected people provided with adequate compensation.
- Ensuring emissions reductions are permanent and additional (i.e. would not have taken place anyway) and that forest destruction is not shifted elsewhere ('leakage').

The principal risks inherent in REDD+ relate to anticipated social and environmental impacts and the consequences of poor governance.

## Poor governance

### **(i) Corruption and misappropriation of REDD+ funds**

Corruption presents a problem in most countries preparing to receive REDD+ funds. Many rank low when measured against internationally accepted corruption and governance indicators.<sup>9</sup> They have fragile governance structures, weak institutions, and poor legal frameworks and/or enforcement records which have led to widespread illegality in the forest sector. Consequently the risks of inequitable distribution, elite capture, misappropriation of funds, deception, carbon

crime and conflict are high. Moreover, lack of financial transparency and poor record keeping increase the risk that REDD+ funds will be misappropriated or diverted to other projects according to political agendas.

### **(ii) Criminal activity**

Weak governance will provide new opportunities for criminal activities, including carbon fraud, and eventually the involvement of organised crime. Poor law enforcement and the levels of illegality in the timber industry indicate many of these countries will be unprepared to deal with the challenges carbon crime will present. Unless strong laws are enacted and supported by effective law enforcement, there is a substantial risk that vested interests and criminal elements will undermine REDD+ and prevent it from achieving its objectives.

Carbon markets add another layer of complexity to governance issues. Regulatory regimes in many REDD+ countries are weak, making any forest carbon market established in those countries vulnerable to exploitation by organised crime, as well as tax fraud and money laundering. The risk of organised crime involvement is amplified by the significant funding for REDD+ which carbon markets are expected to generate.

## Cambodia

For over 15 years, Global Witness has investigated corruption and conflict in Cambodia, exposing how mismanagement of the forest sector has fuelled conflict, corruption and human rights abuses. Despite years of promises by Cambodia's government to reform the forest sector, high level corruption and illegal trade in timber continues across the borders with Lao PDR, Viet Nam and Thailand. Lack of transparency and accountability, and ongoing corruption in Cambodia, risk undermining the implementation of REDD+.

In 2002, a logging moratorium was introduced, with the majority of forestry concessions cancelled by 2006 and replaced with annual coupes. The Government recently took steps to reform forest management and endorsed a national forest plan including law enforcement. In early 2010, Prime Minister Hun Sen changed the leadership of Cambodia's Forest Administration. The extent to which these efforts will address the underlying causes of deforestation, including illegality and corruption, is yet to be determined.

REDD+ provides an opportunity for enabling governance reform. However, a robust system to monitor its implementation, coupled with law enforcement, is essential to ensure these reforms tackle the underlying causes of deforestation. Regional cooperation with law enforcement agencies in neighbouring countries is also essential to address illegal cross-border timber trade.

## Corruption risks

Based on real cases in countries undergoing 'REDD+ readiness' or in projects under the CDM, the following corruption risks have been identified:<sup>10</sup>

- **Inappropriate validation**

Bribery, corruption or conflicts of interest can influence validators' decisions with regard to projects. Fraud can also take the form of project sponsors presenting inaccurate or misleading data.

- **Overestimation of carbon benefits**

There may be strong incentives to overestimate the amount of carbon emissions reduced / carbon stocks enhanced. Agencies responsible for measuring, reporting and verifying emissions (MRV) may also be subject to political pressure from state elites wanting to maximise the potential of emission reduction schemes to generate revenues.

- **Verification of fictitious projects**

MRV governance weaknesses could result in verification of projects that never took place or developers seeking payments for illegitimate projects.

- **Double-counting and fraudulent trade of carbon credits**

There have been instances of commercial fraud in carbon credit trading on global carbon markets, including practices such as selling fictitious credits for non-existent or illegitimate projects, or with the same credits sold to multiple buyers. Such practices are made possible by poorly regulated carbon markets and the intangible and complex nature of carbon credits.

- **Misappropriation of carbon rights**

In some countries corrupt carbon brokers and project developers may be taking advantage of opaque negotiation processes to take over local landowners' carbon rights in a fraudulent manner, in some cases with the complicity of government officials.

## Social impacts

People who live in or around forests and have depended upon them for generations are often not recognised under domestic laws as having rights or legal title. Even if land ownership is recognised, land title documents are often poorly maintained or easily forged. Indigenous and forest dependent peoples are, therefore, vulnerable to political interests, corrupt officials or fraudsters claiming ownership over the forest or its carbon. REDD+ money intended for social development could also be misappropriated.

Although it is usually assumed that the owner of the forested land also owns the carbon, an alternative view has emerged that carbon ownership should be considered as a separate property right distinct from land ownership. Separating carbon rights from land ownership carries several risks. The intangible nature of 'carbon rights' means the only physical evidence of ownership is a piece of paper and/or an electronic record in a register. This makes fraudulent claims of ownership more difficult to detect. Moreover, as an arbitrary legal fiction it is less likely to be understood or valued properly. Owning and trading in 'air' is not easy to communicate.

Unclear land tenure and legal rights could lead to evictions and loss of access to the forest's basic goods and services by those dependent on them. Thus the risk of conflict and social unrest is very real and of great concern.

## Environmental impacts

REDD+ has the potential to enhance biodiversity as well as water and soil conservation. But it cannot be assumed this will be the case. If REDD+ is poorly designed and implemented there is a risk it could incentivise the expansion of industrial scale logging operations into intact natural forests, thereby leading to the conversion of carbon dense natural forests into biodiversity-poor plantations or degraded forests. There is also a risk of displaced pressures, whereby protecting high carbon forests in one area leads to additional pressure to convert or degrade other ecosystems that may be important for biodiversity or flood regulation, such as wetlands. Moreover, actions which protect one area may result, directly or indirectly, in shifting exploitation to another area (such as converting non-forested peatlands to agriculture) and thereby increasing emissions (leakage), while forest fires or disease could mean that emissions reductions are not permanent.



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REDD+ should empower forest-dependent communities to develop strategies to prevent encroachment and illegal activities.

## The importance of governance, enforcement and safeguards

Money alone will not stop forest destruction. The main drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, such as agricultural expansion, logging, road building and other infrastructure development, are often symptoms of a broader failure of governance and lack of law enforcement. The lessons of history are evident. If we fail to act on them and do not prioritise governance, enforcement, financial transparency and safeguards to avert risks, implemented in the context of policies that ensure social and environmental benefits ('multiple benefits'), REDD+ will not only fail, it will accelerate destruction and descend into conflict. This much is certain.

REDD+ cannot be removed from its governance context – governance is the cornerstone on which REDD+ will succeed or fail. The potential for perverse outcomes could be further complicated by carbon markets because of the significant funding they could generate and the greater controls needed to regulate them. The fundamental requirements of good governance for REDD+ implementation are:

1. Clear, coherent policy, laws and regulations (setting the rules),
2. Effective implementation and enforcement of those policies, laws and regulations (ensuring the rules are followed), and
3. Transparent and accountable decision-making and

## Corruption and “carbon cowboys” in Papua New Guinea

In 2009, a number of media reports alleged that Papua New Guinea's Office of Climate Change was fraudulently issuing forest carbon credits, by claiming ownership of forest carbon and trading it with foreign companies without any legal right to do so. These transactions were allegedly worth millions of dollars. In July 2009, the head of Papua New Guinea's Office of Climate Change was suspended amid allegations of improper deals involving carbon credits.<sup>11</sup>

Throughout 2009 there were also reports of “carbon cowboys” operating in PNG, who were accused of manipulating local forest owners to surrender their carbon rights. Villagers were reported to have been threatened at gunpoint to hand over their rights.<sup>12</sup>

institutions (ensuring the system functions transparently and equitably and incorporates checks and balances).<sup>13</sup>

The high-risk context in which REDD+ activities will take place has led to an increasing recognition of the importance of incorporating social and environmental

safeguards as well as provisions to ensure good governance of REDD+. In essence, safeguards are measures to prevent adverse impacts, and as such are central to achieving emissions reductions. Seven safeguards were eventually agreed on in draft form by negotiators in Copenhagen in December 2009 (see box below). These include provisions on governance as well as measures to prevent social and environmental harm. However, provisions to ensure they are implemented, monitored, reported on and verified are less easy to agree, especially in the UNFCCC where so many countries need to reach consensus and broader issues are in play. Monitoring, reporting and verification of the safeguards, which collectively provide the teeth to ensure their implementation, are particularly controversial and are expected to continue to be a source of controversy in Cancun. However, outside the UNFCCC, progress is being made under UN-REDD, the FCPF and the FIP to develop common minimum standards on safeguards, and to provide guidance on their monitoring, reporting and verification.

## Draft REDD+ Safeguards agreed in Copenhagen

1. Consistency with national forest programmes and international agreements (policy coherence)
2. Transparent and effective governance structures
3. Respect for knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and local communities
4. Full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders
5. Consistency with conservation of biodiversity and ensuring against conversion of natural forests
6. Addressing risk of reversals (ensuring permanence)
7. Reducing displacement of emissions (addressing leakage)

Global Witness is advocating for:

- strong safeguards in the UNFCCC REDD+ text
- common minimum standards on governance and safeguards across REDD+ delivery mechanisms that reflect best practice
- provisions that ensure good governance of REDD+ and implementation of safeguards
- a robust system for monitoring, reporting and verification of safeguards implementation and governance provisions.

## Carbon Harvesting Corporation and Liberia

Global Witness recently investigated a proposed deal between the Liberian government and the UK-based Carbon Harvesting Corporation (CHC). CHC had sought the allocation of a 400,000 hectare forest concession - which would have been by far the country's largest forest concession - from which to sell carbon credits on voluntary carbon offset markets.

After examining the financial, social and environmental implications of the deal, Global Witness became aware of irregular payments allegedly made by the head of CHC to members of the Liberian government. Global Witness forwarded this information to the City of London Police's Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit (OACU), which subsequently made an arrest and initiated an investigation. At the time of writing, the OACU has not formally laid charges relating to the alleged bribery, and the investigation is ongoing.

The Liberian government has also initiated an investigation into those connected with the proposed CHC deal. Following the OACU arrest and a report in the Financial Times,<sup>14</sup> Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf announced the formation of an investigative committee, led by Counsellor T. Negbalee Warner. The committee's findings, released in October 2010, have led to swift action by the President, who has referred several government officials to the Liberian Justice Ministry for further investigation. It remains unclear, however, whether all of the committee's recommendations regarding those who should be held to account for their involvement in the deal will be followed.

## Priorities for REDD+

The sums pledged for 'REDD+ readiness' are enormous and expectations for future financial flows are even higher. Inevitably there will be competition for funds and differences of opinion on priorities for spending. Based on the assumption that payments will ultimately be for results in terms of carbon, the emphasis to date has been on technological issues around setting reference levels and methodology for measuring emissions reductions. But this is like trying to build one wall of a house without laying the foundations. The first and overriding priority should be to build a foundation which ensures good governance of REDD+ and implementation of safeguards and prepares for the inevitable enforcement challenges. Only then can emissions reductions be achieved and, more importantly, maintained.



## Building blocks for good governance and enforcement of REDD+

- **Genuine inclusive and participatory processes for design and implementation of REDD+ at national and international levels.**  
Standards vary widely. Experience to date must be analysed and used to improve standards and processes going forward.
- **Comprehensive and independent country assessments of governance challenges and weaknesses.**  
One-off assessments are required using methodology being trialled in pilot countries to diagnose needs and determine the governance reforms necessary.<sup>15</sup>
- **Appropriate, targeted and sustained capacity building programmes for all stakeholders.** Capacity building programmes should be developed on the basis of governance and needs assessments. They must be fit-for-purpose and cover *all* aspects of REDD+, not just setting reference levels and measuring emissions reduction.
- **Practical systems for monitoring governance and safeguards implementation ('non-carbon' monitoring).**  
As well as MRV of emissions reductions, monitoring systems are needed to track and verify: a) progress on building good governance and implementing social safeguards, and b) environmental benefits and impacts. To build confidence and trust and guard against vested interest, they should incorporate independent monitoring of REDD+ implementation (IM-REDD) involving civil society. Extensive experience can be drawn on to develop standards for IM-REDD, including Independent Forest Monitoring programmes implemented in Asia, Africa and Latin America.<sup>16</sup>
- **Analysis and application of lessons learned from the CDM.**  
Lessons must be learned from the difficulties that have arisen under the CDM, particularly corruption risks, and those lessons applied constructively to REDD+.
- **Stronger coordination between REDD+ and FLEGT (forest law enforcement, governance and trade) initiatives to ensure they reinforce each other.**  
A wealth of knowledge and experience exist from attempts to tackle illegal logging and strengthen forest law enforcement and governance. It must be drawn upon and applied to REDD+ to avoid repeating past mistakes or 'reinventing the wheel'. The REDD+ and FLEGT communities have been working largely separately at national and international levels. This needs to be rectified since coordination between them is essential to ensure optimum outcomes.
- **Engaging the regulatory and enforcement community in the design of REDD+.**  
Experience with regulating wildlife trade and ozone-depleting substances has shown that failure to engage the enforcement and regulatory community in the design of international frameworks results in loopholes and unanticipated illegal trade. Regulatory and enforcement officers must be engaged now to ensure REDD+ is practical and enforceable.
- **Building cooperative enforcement mechanisms to combat organised crime.**  
Organised crime knows no borders. Cooperation between law enforcement agencies within and between countries engaged in REDD+ is essential to establish communication channels, share information, and enable cross-border operations. Mechanisms already established to tackle cross-border environmental crime, such as in the wildlife sector, should be drawn on to inform REDD+ enforcement and, if appropriate, could be expanded to encompass REDD+ related crime.
- **Transparent financial mechanisms and auditing tools to fight corruption.**  
Lessons must be learned and applied from initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). In addition, existing and emerging systems for auditing, such as corruption audits, participatory audits and performance audits, need to be analysed and the lessons applied to develop standards and guidelines for REDD+.

## Recommendations

- 1** REDD+ readiness activities should prioritise the establishment of building blocks for good governance, including effective law enforcement, and financial transparency.
- 2** The UNFCCC REDD+ agreement should include provisions for strong safeguards and good governance and means to ensure their implementation.
- 3** A REDD+ monitoring system should incorporate robust systems for 'non-carbon' monitoring as well as MRV of emissions reductions, i.e. systems for monitoring: a) governance and social safeguards, and b) environmental benefits and impacts.
- 4** National systems for governance assessment and monitoring should include participatory independent monitoring led by local civil society and involving all stakeholders.
- 5** REDD+ policies should ensure social and environmental benefits ('multiple benefits').
- 6** The UNFCCC REDD+ agreement should include a specific objective to protect intact natural forests in developing countries from deforestation or further degradation.
- 7** Financial mechanisms for REDD+ should explicitly exclude funds being used to support or subsidise activities which result in carbon emissions, including industrial logging or conversion of forests to plantations.
- 8** REDD+ funds should empower indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities to develop strategies to prevent encroachment and illegal activities, for example through independent monitoring.
- 9** REDD+ should support sustainable alternatives to industrial logging that contribute lasting and equitable development benefits to forest communities and the economies of developing countries.
- 10** REDD+ policies and actions should prioritise the protection of intact natural forests and support the restoration of degraded forests using mixed indigenous species.
- 11** It should be made clear in the process of defining activities to be funded by REDD+ that 'sustainable management of forests' excludes management activities resulting in carbon emissions, and that supporting such activities is subsidiary to the protection of intact natural forests

## Further reading

*A Decade of Experience, Lessons Learned from Independent Monitoring*. Global Witness November 2009.

*Building Confidence in REDD: Monitoring Beyond Carbon*, Global Witness, November 2009.

*Principles for Independent Monitoring of REDD (IM-REDD)*, Global Witness, June 2010.

Jade Saunders and Rosalind Reeve, *Monitoring governance for implementation of REDD+*, background paper presented at Expert workshop on Monitoring Governance Safeguards in REDD+, May 24-25, 2010, Chatham House, London.

Joëlle de Sépibus, *The environmental integrity of the CDM mechanism – A legal analysis of its institutional and procedural shortcomings*, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research, Working Paper No 2009/24, May 2009.

Marie Chêne, *Corruption, auditing and carbon emission reduction schemes*, Transparency International, U4 Expert Answer no 251, 6 Jul 2010.



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REDD+ should prioritise the protection of intact natural forests and support the restoration of degraded forests using mixed indigenous species.

## End notes

- 1 During the Copenhagen climate conference in December 2009, Australia, France, Japan, Norway, the UK and the US pledged US\$3.5 billion to finance REDD+ from 2010 to 2012. Further funding was pledged by Denmark, Germany and Sweden, bringing the total to over US\$4 billion by May 2010 when Presidents and Ministers met for the Oslo Forest and Climate Conference. For further information see [www.osloclfc2010.no](http://www.osloclfc2010.no)
- 2 The five activities agreed by negotiators in Copenhagen to be included within REDD+ are: (a) reducing emissions from deforestation; (b) reducing emissions from forest degradation; (c) conservation of forest carbon stocks; (d) sustainable management of forest; and (e) enhancement of forest carbon stocks. Collectively the last three represent the 'plus'. At the time of writing, negotiations on REDD+ have reopened, including negotiations on the scope of the mechanism, meaning final agreement on the five activities is uncertain.
- 3 See G. R. van der Werf, D. C. Morton, R. S. DeFries, J. G. J. Olivier, P. S. Kasibhatla, R. B. Jackson, G. J. Collatz and J. T. Randerson, *CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from forest loss*, *Nature Geoscience*, Vol. 2, Nov 2009. A summary of the report is available at: <http://www.biology.duke.edu/jackson/ng09.pdf>
- 4 The UN-REDD Programme is implemented jointly by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and UN Development Programme (UNDP).
- 5 Emissions are measured in metric tons of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent (MtCO<sub>2</sub>e). CO<sub>2</sub> is used as the reference gas against which the other greenhouse gases are measured since it has the smallest global warming potential or GWP.
- 6 In August 2010, a REDD methodology was approved for the first time under the VCS Programme. For further information see <http://www.gazprom-mt.com/mediacentre/article.asp?pressid=47>
- 7 Reforestation is the process of restoring forests on land that was once forested. Afforestation is the process of creating forests on land that was previously unforested.
- 8 See, for example, *World Bank Defends Controversial HFC Carbon-Cut Plants*, Michael Szabo, Reuters, 23 Aug 2010 <http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFLDE67M14920100823>
- 9 Such as the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, or the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.
- 10 Marie Chêne, *Corruption, auditing and carbon emission reduction schemes*, Transparency International, U4 Expert Answer no 251, 6 Jul 2010.
- 11 See reports of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation on 1 July 2009 at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/07/01/2613841.htm?section=world>
- 12 See <http://www.rightsandresources.org/blog.php?id=493>
- 13 Jade Saunders and Rosalind Reeve, *Monitoring governance for implementation of REDD+*, background paper presented at Expert workshop on Monitoring Governance Safeguards in REDD+, May 24-25, 2010, Chatham House, London.
- 14 See the Financial Times reports "Probe as carbon deal hit by bribe accusations" and "Police probe as carbon deal hit by bribe accusation", 4 June 2010
- 15 World Resources Institute (WRI), the World Bank and UN-REDD are all developing tools for governance assessments, the most advanced of which is being piloted by WRI.
- 16 See Global Witness's report *A Decade of Experience, Lessons Learned from Independent Monitoring*, November 2009.



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Global Witness investigates and campaigns to prevent natural resource-related conflict and corruption and associated environmental and human rights abuses.

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